Most security advice assumes the attacker is a stranger. In a lot of homes, the attacker pays the phone bill.
The usual threat model pictures one villain. Someone far away with no password, trying to get in. So we build walls for that person, with login screens, two-factor codes and encryption.
I spent some time this week reading research on how abusive partners actually track people, and that picture falls apart fast. They don't need to break in because they're already inside. They know the passcode because they watched it get typed a hundred times. Their name is on the family plan, the Wi-Fi router, the smart lock and the car. As far as the software knows, they're the admin.
The person being watched usually can't tell. They only notice that their partner always seems to know where they've been.
The tools are ordinary
A 2018 study led by researchers at Cornell Tech found that most of the apps used to spy on partners aren't spyware at all. They're ordinary apps with a legitimate purpose, like child safety or anti-theft, turned against someone. These apps do exactly what they were built to do, and that's the problem. The study found antivirus tools didn't treat them as a threat.
Same with a $29 Bluetooth tracker dropped in a bag, or a car app that shows the registered owner where the car is right now. In 2020, a San Francisco woman told police her husband was using their Tesla's app to stalk and harass her, in violation of a restraining order. Both their names were on the title, but he had set himself up as the account admin and listed her as an additional driver. Tesla told her it couldn't remove his access while his name stayed on the title. He denied misusing the car, and a judge later ruled for Tesla.
Sit with that for a second. She had a restraining order and her name on the title. He had the admin login, and that's what decided who controlled the car.
To me that's the real bug. One account owns the thing, and everyone else in the house lives under it.
One owner is a design choice
Single-owner accounts feel natural to build. Somebody signs up, somebody pays, somebody gets control. I understand why teams default to it. It's easier to model and easier to bill.
A household isn't one person, though. When a relationship turns abusive or ends, whoever holds the admin login keeps the keys to the other person's daily life. They can watch the doorbell camera from work. They can unlock the door or crank the thermostat from across town. They can reset a password after the breakup and walk right back in.
None of that takes hacking. The product only has to work as designed.
Laws are writing the fix we skipped
California and New York now require automakers to shut off an abuser's remote access to a car within two business days of a valid survivor request. Both states also require connected cars to have a way to turn off location tracking from inside the car by July 1, 2028, and it can't depend on an app, a login or an internet connection.
That's a physical off switch written into law because the products didn't ship with one. I'd rather engineers build it because it's right than because a statute forced them to.
An idea I can't shake
Picture the day someone finally leaves. Whatever fits is in the trunk. There's a place to go. And the whole drive, they're checking the mirror and wondering whether a dot on someone else's phone is following them there.
Maybe it's the car's own app. Maybe it's a cellular GPS box stuck under the bumper with a magnet. The tracker alerts on iPhone and Android can't see that kind of device at all, because they're built for Bluetooth tags. The person who most needs an answer can't get one from their phone.
A mechanic with the car up on a lift has a much better shot.
So here's a thought experiment I keep turning over. Picture a quiet network of vetted mechanics who check cars for hidden trackers. Survivors get referred through domestic violence advocates, the same way shelters keep their locations off the public internet. No app sits on a phone the abuser might be watching. The survivor gets a shop and a time slot, and the mechanic gets a car to inspect.
The cover story is the clever part. If a tracker is on that car, the abuser is going to see it sit at an auto shop for an hour. So the shop does a real oil change or swaps the air filter while the car is up on the lift. The survivor drives home with an ordinary receipt and an ordinary charge on the bank statement. If anyone asks, the car needed an oil change, and the receipt backs that up because the oil really did get changed. The abuser is none the wiser.
I'm not building it, and it has real problems. Pulling a tracker off a car titled to the abuser could count as tampering. The moment the dot stops moving, the abuser knows something changed, so the timing has to fit the survivor's safety plan. Those are hard problems. People solve hard problems all the time once someone decides the idea is worth the trouble.
What bugs me is that an idea like this would never come up in a normal planning meeting. Nobody in that room is picturing the person checking the mirror.
Add one more person to the threat model
That's what I'm asking you to change. If you build anything people share, take ten minutes and picture the worst person who could get hold of it. Then picture who they'd use it against, and build something for that second person.
Start with the person sitting next to your user on the couch. They already know the PIN and they pay for the account. Before launch, ask whether everyone in the home can see who else has access. Ask whether someone can leave a shared account without the owner's permission, and whether tracking can be turned off without the owner's login.
If any of those answers is no, fix it before you ship. Someone you'll never meet may be counting on it.
Sources
- The Spyware Used in Intimate Partner Violence, Chatterjee et al.
- An abused wife took on Tesla over tracking tech. She lost, Reuters via CNBC
- New domestic violence protections in California and New York connected vehicle laws, Barack Ferrazzano
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